Liberalism and Rights of Nature: A Comparative Legal and Historical Perspective

Abstract

A growing number of jurisdictions have recently granted rights to nature. This article places the potential disruptions generated by this legal development in historical, comparative perspective. The questions that scholars are asking about rights of nature (RoN) are similar to many of those asked by historians and legal scholars about human rightsholders. These questions arise from some of the tensions within liberalism. Placing these tensions in comparative context offers a framework with which to interpret RoN developments. Doing so demonstrates, first, the capacity of the existing liberal order to incorporate challenges into already functioning structures and, second, that such efforts to manage the claims of new subjects of rights nonetheless can transform relations. In our conclusion, we argue that a comparative perspective may allay the tendency to exoticise rights of nature by examining the extent to which their development in sometime contentious and sometimes complementary relationship with democratic institutions is reflected in historical efforts to define and make meaningful the rights of human rightsholders.

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