Reductionistic Explanations of Cognitive Information Processing: Bottoming Out in Neurochemistry

Abstract

A common motivation for engaging in reductionistic research is to ground explanations in the most basic processes operative in the mechanism responsible for the phenomenon to be explained. I argue for a different motivation-directing inquiry to the level of organization at which the components of a mechanism enable the work that results in the phenomenon. In the context of reductionistic accounts of cognitive information processing I argue that this requires going down to a level that is largely overlooked in these discussions, that of chemistry. In discussions of cognitive information processing, the brain is often viewed as essentially an electrical switching system and many theorists treat electrical switching as the level at which mechanistic explanations should bottom out. I argue, drawing on examples of peptidergic and monoaminergic neurons, that how information is processed is determined by the specific chemical reactions occurring in individual neurons. Accordingly, mechanistic explanations of cognitive information processing need to take into account the chemical reactions involved.

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