Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Francesco Decarolis · Leonardo Maria Giuffrida · Elisabetta Iossa · Vincenzo Mollisi · Giancarlo Spagnolo

94 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Public Procurement and Policy Public Policy and Administration Research Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

Abstract To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).

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