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Team-based incentives in transportation firms: An experiment
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References

  • 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments9,517 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 2000Performance Pay and Productivity2,491 cited
  • 2013Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?654 cited
  • 2011Incentives and creativity: evidence from the academic life sciences651 cited
  • 2001Optimal Incentives for Teams547 cited
  • 1984Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents506 cited
  • 1991Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations464 cited
  • 2003Professionals Play Minimax329 cited
  • 2007Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives243 cited
  • 1991Optimal Contracts for Teams223 cited
  • 2005Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships216 cited
  • 2017Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field: An Experiment in Public Transportation212 cited
  • 1987Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams196 cited
  • 1993Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships

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