Abstract This chapter analyzes and assesses the pessimistic meta-meta-induction, PMMI, which is an antirealist argument put forward to counter a realist response to the pessimistic meta-induction, PMI. The dialectic in which the PMMI arises unfolds as follows. Scientific realism, the view that our current successful theories are probably approximately true, is challenged by the PMI, according to which many successful theories in the past of science were later refuted. The realist response claims that science has improved a lot since the times of the past refuted theories and that these improvements block the PMI and save realism. The antirealist’s PMMI then counters that past realists could have said the same thing, namely that science has improved a lot in the same manner as realists claim for the recent past, but those improvements didn’t help past realists, as subsequent theory refutations show; hence, the recent improvements likewise don’t help current realists block the PMI to save realism; therefore, the antirealist’s PMMI concludes, the realists’ response to the PMI fails. This chapter attempts to show that the antirealist’s PMMI does not succeed.
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