Bibliometric Equilibrium

Abstract

Abstract The general concept of bibliometric equilibrium is introduced, and a model that describes its particular case is proposed. This model considers a set of authors choosing strategies for submitting articles to a set of journals, considering the probabilities of accepting the articles and the rewards received. The amount of remuneration depends on the journal ratings formed as a result of the decisions made. A bibliometric equilibrium in such a system (which is a modification of the Nash equilibrium) exists under natural assumptions. In a particular case, remuneration and citation strategies may depend on a priori perceptions of the quality of the journals. The conditions under which the equilibrium corresponds to these perceptions are discussed. Several directions for the development of the theory of publication systems are outlined, within which authors, editors of journals, and coordinators of scientific research interact.

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