The timely administration of justice: using computational simulations to evaluate institutional reforms at the CJEU

Joshua C. Fjelstul · Matthew J. Gabel · Clifford James Carrubba

17 citations0/0 files storedJournal of European Public Policy

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies European and International Law Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) faces a growing backlog of cases and delays in administering justice. Identifying the factors that prolong the resolution of cases is critical for designing successful institutional reforms. In this article, we use a Bayesian model to identify the characteristics of cases, judges, and the Court's internal procedures that affect the duration of cases. Then, we run computational simulations that use our model to estimate the likely effect of potential institutional reforms aimed at reducing the Court's backlog. We offer policy recommendations based on our findings. Our methodology can be tailored to study the efficiency of other domestic and international courts.

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References

2011The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European Union 2011Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments of chambers 2014International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements 2000Beyond Principals and Agents 2020Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union 2019How do institutional constraints affect judicial decision-making? The European Court of Justice’s French language mandate 2018Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice 2021How the Chamber System at the CJEU Undermines the Consistency of the Court’s Application of EU Law

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