Utility and mechanism design in multi-agent systems: An overview

Abstract

Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand transportation services, delivery drones will fly parcels in our skies, power plants will provide renewable energy reliably. In many of these systems, there is no single decision-maker with full information and authority. Instead, the system performance greatly depends on the decisions made by interacting entities with local information and limited communication capabilities. Game theory, intended as the study of multi-agent decision-making, is a fitting paradigm to tackle many of the associated challenges. Moving from this observation, in this paper we review how tools and ideas from game theory can be brought to bear on the coordination of multi-agent systems. At the heart of the proposed approach is the design and influence of agents’ preferences so that their local optimization induces a desirable system behavior. Its applicability spans a variety of settings irrespective of whether the decision makers are strategic (e.g., drivers in a road network), or not (e.g., delivery drones). Along the way, we also discuss future research directions and connections with related research areas including algorithmic game theory, incentive and mechanism design, economics, computational complexity, and approximation algorithms.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 27 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.