Intertemporal choice tasks are used to measure how people make decisions between outcomes spaced out in time. Measurements from those tasks are often used to study impulsivity and self-control, concepts central in theories and empirical research concerning addiction, substance use, psychopathology, and organisational behaviour, among many. Accordingly, preferences for smaller rewards received sooner, over larger rewards received later, have been linked to higher impulsivity and less self-control. This paper is a critique of that approach. To present our argument, we first provide a historical overview of research on time preferences tracking the theoretical link between intertemporal choice, impulsivity, and self-control. Our subsequent conceptual analysis reveals that impulsivity concerns a lack of reflection on one’s choices, not a lack of concern with the future, and self-control concerns internal conflict due to temptation, rather than future-orientedness. People may, and do, use self-control to choose a "smaller-sooner" reward or impulsively select a "larger-later" reward. We also address technical limitations pertaining to the reliability, external and predictive validity of intertemporal choice tasks. We argue that, therefore, impulsivity and self-control cannot be measured using a standard intertemporal choice task. We canvass possible future directions for decision-making models in this area, providing the basis for new understanding of how impulsivity, self-control, and time preferences influence behaviour across different domains. We suggest that to study impulsivity and self-control in a temporal context, more information is needed about agents’ motivation and deliberative process.
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