Putting Properties First

Abstract

Abstract This philosophical work is about the metaphysical preconditions of natural science. It develops and defends a new metaphysical theory of natural modality called ‘Modal Platonism’, which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties—such as mass and charge—are ontologically fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the dispositions of things. The theory differs from other ‘properties-first’ approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory, it is argued, solves a range of puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that natural modality is a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 32 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.