The effects of public goods framing for a union default policy

Abstract

Union provision of collective bargaining and political lobbying generates positive outcomes across society. A union default holds significant promise to revive the flagging fortunes of unions by enabling them to recruit many more members, extend their bargaining coverage, and place them in a stronger position to deliver these positive outcomes. Non-unionism is the default setting in employment arrangements. A union default would reverse this, so employees are defaulted into membership in the first instance, but with a right to opt-out. In this article the authors test whether framing unions as providers of public goods increases worker support for a union default and intention to stay in a union, if defaulted. The authors find that workers are significantly more likely to support a union default and stay in union membership in scenarios involving positive framing for unions.

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