From international organizations to local governments: how foreign environmental aid reaches subnational beneficiaries in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico

Abstract

The fight against climate change increasingly connects International Organizations (IOs), national governments, and subnational governments. How are international funds to fight climate change and environmental degradation distributed to subnational beneficiaries? We develop a novel multilevel theory that poses that tension between the preferences of the IO and national governments helps explain the subnational distribution of environmental aid – even more than pure environmental or social need. Simply put, whomever contributes more to IO-sponsored green projects determines who gets funds at the subnational level. While we understand that both actors have multiple preferences associated with green aid allocation, our theory of multilevel fund allocation expects the IO to prioritize provinces and states with low-development. Conversely, national governments will prioritize domestic electoral interests. We test this theory with a new data from the largest international donor of environmental aid, the Global Environment Facility. Empirically, we focus on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico between 1997 and 2017.

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