Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: The Scholars' Initiative

Abstract

Winston Churchill once lamented that the Balkans had produced far more history than they could possibly consume. The history to which he referred was the lengthy litany of wrongs and retribution that had been committed by the various groups that inhabited the peninsula. What he did not say—or, perhaps, realize—was that the great bulk of what passes for history among the region's peoples was of relatively recent vintage, having been written over the previous century by apologists for the region's newly created nation-states. Nor could he know that the Balkans would share in the bounty of a second great age of state- and history-making at the other end of the twentieth century. Like the self-serving accounts of newly created states everywhere, the Balkan narratives are highly selective in their choice of facts, but simultaneously accommodate compelling myths that stress each nation's achievements, its heroism, and, oftentimes, its victimization at the hands of its former oppressors. But none has been as influential as the Serbian national narrative, which helped create the centrifugal forces that tore Yugoslavia apart.1 Among the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia enjoyed a substantial head start in constructing its national narrative after winning autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. It informed the calculus of Serbia's leaders and the heroism of its armies through three Balkan Wars (1912–1918) and the subsequent establishment of the tightly centralized, Serbian-dominated “first” Yugoslavia (1918–1941).2 Resentment against Serbian hegemony inspired not only the country's ready partition by the Axis powers and the genocidal terror of the Croatian Ustaša puppet state that they established in 1941, but also Marshall Tito's resolve to reconstitute a “second” Yugoslavia in 1945, in which the country's 38 percent Serbian plurality would become merely the first among equals. Although Tito appealed to the “unity and brotherhood” of Communist Yugoslavia's nineteen national and ethnic groups, it was the sober calculus of “strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia” that ensured peace and stability among them.3 Slobodan Milošević's demagogic attempt to reassert Serbian domination prompted the creation of not only a half-dozen new Balkan states, but a corresponding number of custom-made national histories as well, based, once again, on a combination of victimization and martial heroism.4 Today more than ever, the peoples of the Yugoslav successor states are divided by a common history that has been edited, demarcated, and steadfastly protected with the same resolve they have applied to their newly constructed territorial frontiers. Inevitably, each narrative employs a different array of “truths,” many of which are either distorted or blatantly untrue, while carefully excising “inconvenient facts” that promote the utility of multiethnic coexistence and justify the dissonant narrative or political agenda of other national groups. The resulting divergent recitations of history not only unite each new republic's constituent “state-forming” nationality, but sow mistrust, resentment, and even hatred between them and other peoples with whom they had previously coexisted. The perceptual gap is particularly wide between Serbia (and Bosnia's Republika Srpska), on the one hand, and the dominant national groups in Croatia, Kosovo, and the Bosnian Federation, on the other. In keeping with their long-established national narrative of victimization and heroism, most Serbs portray themselves as the selfless creators and defenders of multiethnic Yugoslavia, whose sacrifices were negated by the Croats in World War II and again at the end of the Cold War, when they were abetted by Slovene, Bosnian, and Albanian secessionists. Central to the Serbian narrative is the genocidal intent of successive Croatian regimes that murdered a million Serbs during the world war and would have resumed their work in 1991—this time with the assistance of Bosnia's and Kosovo's Muslims—had their intended victims not acted to prevent it.5 For their part, the Slovenes and Croats portray their secession from Yugoslavia as a necessary response to Serbia's violation of the Yugoslav constitution, rather than as a selfish refusal to share their greater wealth and tax revenue with the federation's poorer republics. To them, the outbreak of war in 1991 was Serbian aggression, compounded in Croatia by the unilateral commission of war crimes against prisoners of war and civilians alike.6 Far from being “fundamentalists” bent on executing or expelling their Serb minorities, Muslim Bosnians and Kosovars claim peaceful intent while minimizing the insecurities created by their respective quests for freedom from Belgrade's embrace.7 In the hands of nationalist politicians and journalists, the tragic events of the 1990s continue to be manipulated in ways that have sustained mutual recrimination, further solidifying the cultural gap between the Serbs and their neighbors. But is there an antidote to the corrosive effect that proprietary myths and mass amnesia have on public discourse and popular memory? And even if one exists, who is prepared to work toward its implementation? Certainly not political leaders in the West. Although they eventually intervened militarily to end the humanitarian catastrophe that ethnic cleansing brought to Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), today's presidents and prime ministers focus their attention on immediate, bona fide threats to their own national security. Admittedly, their policymakers and diplomats who work in the Balkans are somewhat more attentive to the problems posed by competing national narratives. Yet their search for solutions is heavily mortgaged by the tactical mindset that traditionally guides the everyday application of foreign policy. Indeed, while national leaders in the United States tend to think in four-year electoral cycles, the career trajectory of foreign service officers is determined by the triennial performance evaluations that precede their transfer to new assignments, which can be halfway around the world. Given this structural reality, U.S. and most other Western diplomats are programmed to fulfill A. J. P. Taylor's observation that they simply “muddle through” by seeking solutions to today's crises within the finite time frame of their current appointments, without the latitude to contemplate or set long-term objectives that could be realized only on somebody else's watch. Such resignation (or diffidence) was evident during the summer of 2000, when President Clinton's special representative for the former Yugoslavia worked feverishly to topple indicted war criminal Slobodan Milošević from power, while dismissing visionary, systemic solutions for the region as unworthy of consideration. This approach is emblematic of Western policy throughout the Balkans, which routinely makes access to foreign credits or and the the of ministers and the of committed to a agenda that the of ethnic This approach at the of among the of the against the and the it to Western diplomats have their on the of political within the have to the gap between the region's peoples by to the Western as the of the and have and while as the and have The for the Yugoslavia has and criminal committed by Yet none of foreign the of political leaders and the great of that to their proprietary This has been the in whose newly leaders and or the criminal of the Milošević but it is also of Bosnian, and Kosovo Albanian who not even the of their narrative of victimization to the Serbian the war crimes committed by their own as they a over public and they continue to and the that Indeed, there are many among the region's political and who the of their but who the to them The gap between and public is particularly great among in the Yugoslav successor This when resumed to the region the of the To it was even to at the Serbian of and who of the Western narrative of the recent the of and to which Serbs had been This only the that are to and a of and and over the public and political leaders in their for to structural that Given their search for could they not also the of systemic solutions necessary to from the of ethnic and that the stability of multiethnic can and problems for which there to be In the Central if today's multiethnic are of that proprietary narratives to mutual and is it to whose accounts of the have of to the of in an The from the that and are to the narratives that have in the peoples of Central But to they would to to which most are and with which they are even they would have to with from the successor states to a common narrative that and each myths the Yugoslav while simultaneously but to their former they would to to the public by and, when politicians to at one on the common that their own have helped leaders from the region's newly were to they would an first the that with mutual and with mutual first this agenda would to be a Indeed, a number of the and to the that the of the and of the it would prevent it from for their was that they did not what the was not and not the of and it could not to a of Nor did it many of the most myths and “inconvenient facts” are to on of the region's newly created in an of many of and of and of of of by the and various national the to the gap between peoples by simultaneously and proprietary myths through a combination of sober and sustained with and public Although continue to over for which there a of most are that are or to the if it is necessary to resolve in the common the latitude to to the of and the of divergent the of the leaders were that it was not necessary to resolve within their and that it was to the of or more or in their to for more on the In that the that there was of the being to the than the public that the was the on the Yugoslav and that it was only a first the in a that continue for as more and more is This is when a that only a even can for the of that have three or without being many and public that the would the of and a narrative, they were that the to and to its with the of to which it and the public that was its To the had to at on one that for to and and that it to an that with public of This to and the that the during its as it did a of and that to the of each even many did not this was This was to and as worked to fulfill which the attempt at mutual and the the was to create of who would attempt to resolve that divided the peoples of the Yugoslav successor this the Serbian and a but of that would Although the of the Yugoslav they were not intended to a narrative of the or other that one would in a To have would have not only with but also the public with a that they would be to and the was to a that would focus but on the in a narrative that would be to the other hand, to the around or other but that to their own and and worked to the of that was the focus on the did not the of of which a that by the on the while them in Kosovo The of Yugoslavia, the of War The the The The War in Croatia, Kosovo in Kosovo, The for the Yugoslavia The also to be To the to to each of the a to of to have would have inspired of were constructed as that could be by or more in each was an to the of that could claim that one or or of had been from consideration. In this that Serbian could of and that have been by a world on the that their nation's forces at the same it leaders to to for to of the more Serbian with the that the to would the to them as The to also to the For the of of had for of more than a half-dozen or and a of a more and more an in realized that to with and in the the of selective particularly from bent on the common narrative that would be Indeed, the of one with a public in the To the and of routinely whose the of many they were to and their an in a new of who could from the nationalist that throughout the successor the same the number of who had their nationalist to the claim to be a of also from in a of number of when to the that to particularly among from the various successor This was without the most that were to between the public of and the of leaders on a of at the was the to a to most the and of Indeed, the to posed by the Milošević of Serbian to for three after from in the further of an to of against or between were even prepared to whose their to the of the popular of with a of In the only one was from the without the between were by a of mutual and with a on the that most the for what the most is that the were by the of from their the successor state who the were particularly in and their in the none were more committed than the Serbian whose with the had been through by with a criminal and the against of Western to as in between successor state they have by an from which Bosnian, and Serb were to is not to that did not the of one or that on their or national but through and acted in at a from the that the But once again, it was not that their it was that the public them as by a different set of The was the of on the who could be to the of each successor This was particularly for a Serbian public that has routinely the of as the they were by The of public was by the of from Yugoslav a number of Serbian from the each was by one of whom was an ethnic This is evident in the of that was to the which was by that the public in each successor state could for themselves that their was as that could not be by nationality, particularly the number who had been and highly of their during the Yugoslav more than a and Western a that popular has helped to of particularly in to a of this is in of it is in a of the world in which first was to a and on the were routinely to of were first at the being on to of the each of whom had the to which from to Although particularly to by and the of the the the of each of were and in a to that could be for a had it was to the and an of in and the successor In the through three The with the of Milošević in a to and the first of at Marshall Tito's former at in the Serbian of Although the there was for a only a of Serbian and and Western to a relatively for an ethnic Serb from there were from the other successor states, that it was to a of and between Serbian and Western could even a of and Indeed, to have at the of by the Yet even as the a was that would the the who in were to a between Serbs and the U.S. of to a for from the Given focus on public were also to more for to the were a in the that had in had a public policy that would an number of at in in there were from of the successor The to be a of the with a of U.S. that would the Bosnian to as were to the to the rather than to a Although were by a from and the mindset of problems were only It was in that first realized that whose had the most could be the most and the a of the Bosnian the in their own simply many of them were to to of the war that from what they to be it was only after an of in of the of Bosnia's that the Albanian to with their Serb at the end of the they even a new who to with Serbian from the other successor states a to the Serbian who were their first to the To and the only Serbian to attempt to in were a of but one of whom to to to the same who had their and during the for a Although of them eventually the for the first time that it be for Serbian to to a common narrative than for of their former victims to them in the The the by an or was to the of multiethnic coexistence is by accounts of national and set a the the of and a first for The between and public was also evident at this The to and to that of the would an in and the Yet this was not at a time when the was three with the more than would be by the to a number of particularly and the to one or of the the time and In the was in a the who was most (or to the and This from the who were and of while the to with and as the work between three and which was to the one of whom the share of the and the first or by as many as a half-dozen The was at the being to The and was by a new from the for which to to the more than successor state who as leaders or But also created a new set of that to be between the Western and successor state the by which could to work that would not their the could to Central whose routinely them to But from or the could be or even for or other from could to Western who were heavily or who were seeking and was by the of three for by from and the were to heavily on the and selfless that sustained the Western who to the of and the choice the of to be to Western It would have been to that were not for Serbs with from and the Given a million and the it was that they had Central the an of leaders who could be to the other hand, public of the within the successor states would be by a greater of in the the ethnic Serb leaders were by three from Croatia, and with from the and The most choice that the substantial of time to and but to work to a that is and This is the when work is in the public were and without Although Central the of the and Western leaders were to In the of them they were or to with the worked with than three leaders from Kosovo, and the Bosnian the in in at the of for and Central after having to work on the during the the were to for the the the by a mass of first that could be to for in the that even as to new leaders to the who had The three through to through the highly public and that to be as to be one that through three new each written by a different it in the of the the focus to the in which the would its to the public and their This than the had an of journalists, public policy Western and throughout the successor The had been by that own had with each of groups, of Nor had there been that they were in the of a but common narrative of the Yugoslav This was evident in the from which for the and that the between and It was in the with which the in the successor within of the in Serbian had a the most of the the of constructing and a based, of public a of more than to the successor as many to to from U.S. and The public in at the of during which time were one at a time to throughout the successor The was by the first of from the Marshall Balkan for which a of for successor states, Kosovo, the Bosnian Serb and the Serbian of was with the with a and written in and the common as for Albanian the Kosovo Albanian for in The also to for that of Western would have as a for their Indeed, the first was in at a in that ensured by Serbia's The Serbian and had been one by and for a popular that the nationalist But on this he as a a that many of the myths that had Serbia's for over had been a by ethnic to Kosovo's Serb by a that was by that between and but not between ethnic Serbs and the of of public was by that the of ethnic Serb was their of the the claim that secession with that the for that would have them within Yet even as it the that Serbs had been to sustained the that there was in of in the and an of and that as the for Serb during the of further the that would myths that many had in the of the of the that Bosnian Muslim and a of and that had in common with the of and Nor had there been a to against or Bosnia's Serb that Milošević's had to justify the ethnic cleansing of more than a million one that has enjoyed even among Western and public in Yugoslavia's and the in for of and Bosnian But by a of it that secession and were established the the of a successor that was but could not be to the of from Kosovo in the the Milošević had that they were In the of the of the in did a Kosovars who the with who in for of of or they it was relatively to the myths that Milošević's had created in to and justify their criminal the most in the the of “inconvenient facts” that the second of the by each In many Yugoslavia's Serbs had had which had been by that it was for either their victims or even Western to in was the of which was first at a in the Bosnian Serb of on the of the of Serbian a there or in but from who to the of far crimes committed by Bosnian and the that Serbian forces had not acted in

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