Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration

Abstract

Since cognitive penetration is supposed to be an empirical phenomenon, recent strategies for analysis have been to define the phenomenon and then interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists apply apparently inconsistent definitions, and accordingly get conflicting answers to the question ‘Is this a genuine case of cognitive penetration?’ This problem can be remedied by returning attention to the three alleged consequences of the possible phenomenon: theory-ladenness of perception in contexts of scientific theory choice, a concern about the general epistemic role of perception, and implications for mental architecture. Any attempt to characterize or define cognitive penetration should be constrained by these consequences. This is a method for interpreting and acquiring experimental data in a way that is agreeable to both sides of the debate. The question shifts to ‘Is this a cognitive-perceptual relation that results in (or constitutes) one or more of the relevant consequences?’

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