References

• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 1969Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case5,199 cited
• 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1982Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation3,178 cited
• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 1994Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure2,732 cited
• 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are1,740 cited
• 2003Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts1,676 cited
• 2006Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash1,642 cited
• 2000How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?1,483 cited
• 1999The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants1,391 cited
• 1997How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed1,255 cited
• 1999The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation1,037 cited
• 1984A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question