From Bayes-optimal to heuristic decision-making in a two-alternative forced choice task with an information-theoretic bounded rationality model

Abstract

Bayes optimal and heuristic decision-making schemes are often considered fundamentally opposed to each other as a framework for studying human choice behavior, although recently it has been proposed that bounded rationality may provide a natural bridge between the two when varying information-processing resources. Here, we investigate a two-alternative forced choice task with varying time constraints, where subjects have to assign multi-component symbolic patterns to one of two stimulus classes. As expected, we find that subjects' response behavior becomes more imprecise with more time pressure. However, we also see that their response behavior changes qualitatively. By regressing subjects' decision weights, we find that decisions allowing for plenty of decision time rely on weighing multiple stimulus features, whereas decisions under high time pressure are made mostly based on a single feature. While the first response pattern is in line with a Bayes-optimal decision strategy, the latter could be considered as an instantiation of heuristic decision-making with cue discounting. When fitting a bounded rational decision model with multiple feature channels and varying information-processing capacity to subjects' responses, we find that the model is able to capture subjects' behavioral change. The model successfully reflects the simplicity of heuristics as well as the efficiency of optimal decision making, thus acting as a bridge between the two approaches.

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