SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation
16 references·0 citing·31 second hop
Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation (2022)Central bank independence in Latin Americ…Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set (2016)Central Bank Independence in …Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures (2015)Central Bank Transparency and…Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future (2008)Central bank independence and…Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence (2005)Globalization Pressures and t…The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy (2003)The Limits of Delegation: Vet…Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions (2002)Theory and Practice of Delega…Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation (2002)Rational Fictions: Central Ba…Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective (2002)Central bank reform, liberali…Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Central Bank Independence and…Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility (1992)Optimal Commitment in Monetar…Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes (1992)Measuring the Independence of…Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries (1991)Political and Monetary Instit…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Democracies (1984)DemocraciesRules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Rules, discretion and reputat…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1977)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)The new institutionalism in organizational analysis (1992)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (2004)The study of organisational autonomy: a conceptual review (2004)Understanding Regulation (2011)Systematising Policy Learning: From Monolith to Dimensions (2012)On the Determination of the Public Debt (1979)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (1992)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model (1983)Economic growth in the 1990s: learning from a decade of reform (2005)THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS (2005)State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace (2007)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (1973)Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies (1991)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts (1980)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY (2005)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems (1997)The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law (1997)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy3,625 cited
  • 1984Democracies2,167 cited
  • 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence1,830 cited
  • 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes1,707 cited
  • 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries1,583 cited
  • 2002Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions813 cited
  • 2003The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy649 cited
  • 1992Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility595 cited
  • 2002Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation502 cited
  • 2015Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures467 cited
  • 2016Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set421 cited
  • 2005Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence412 cited
  • 2008

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future
407 cited
  • 2002Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective391 cited
  • Cited by

    No citing works inside the corpus for this window.