Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes

Guilherme Lambais · Henrik Sigstad

18 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Public Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Judicial and Constitutional Studies Corruption and Economic Development Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

Are politicians in power treated more leniently in court? We show that Brazilian mayoral candidates charged with misconduct are 65 percent less likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election. Politicians play no direct role in the judges’ careers, suggesting that formal independence does not completely insulate the judiciary from political influence. The effect is driven by districts with few judges and by judges with higher career instability.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 18 citations exist upstream.

References

1989Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England 1997The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law 1984The Selection of Disputes for Litigation 2001The Rise of the Regulatory State 1975The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective 2002Legal Origins 2003The injustice of inequality 1994The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.