A Strategic Decision Support System Using Multiplayer Non-Cooperative Games for Resource Allocation After Natural Disasters

Abstract

A severe natural disaster causes concurrent emergencies in separate geographical locations. However, tackling all the emergencies simultaneously with the limited available resources is challenging. A novel single-stage, non-cooperative multiplayer game-based solution approach for resource allocation is proposed in this paper, where the crisis locations in the demand of resources are treated as the players. The game-based decision support system (DSS) is intended to be implemented by the concerned disaster management authority to obtain a practical strategy for the allocation of indivisible and divisible resources among individual players in a limited resource environment. Any feasible allocation is associated with some cost on the basis of a non-monetary cost function. A discrete strategic game is formulated to tackle indivisible resource allocation and a continuous-kernel game for divisible resources. A mathematical analysis establishes that the game with the proposed cost function possesses at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for both types of games. Based on different selection criteria, a particular PSNE is chosen from the collection of multiple PSNEs and used as a desirable resource allocation strategy. A complexity analysis of the proposed algorithm is also carried out. Case studies are given in this paper to demonstrate the results developed. Note to Practitioners—The cost function proposed in this paper to formulate the non-cooperative game-based DSS will be useful to disaster management authorities in resource allocation problems after any natural disaster. While distributing a limited quantity of essential resources, the cost function maintains an overall balance so that none of the disaster locations is deprived or favoured unreasonably. The feasible allocations of the existing resources are determined by the solutions of a multiplayer game. The case study indicates that the disaster management authority can choose different post-disaster ground truths to compute the possible resource demands of the disaster locations. Using the demand vector (a vector comprising the demands of the players as elements) and the number of available resources as the inputs, the game-theoretic model generates the allocation vector, according to which the disaster locations can be allocated resources.

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