Decision and Practical Reasoning

Abstract

Abstract This chapter extends the erotetic theory to decision-making, allowing the definition of a notion of an erotetic agent. The chapter diagnoses widely discussed decision-making phenomena like framing effects and the endowment effect as structurally similar to the reasoning fallacies discussed in previous chapters. The chapter obtains that, as in previous chapters, erotetic equilibrium secures classical standards of rationality, in this case classically rational choice. The chapter also considers how erotetic reasons-based decision-making can facilitate rapid action, making sense of what are sometimes termed “affordances.” Finally, the chapter considers unique threats the erotetic agent faces, and proposes an argument that deliberative democracy has particular legitimacy for erotetic agents: collective judgment at the end of a suitable deliberative process is a better reflection of group agency because it tends to be a better reflection of individual agency.

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