Game-Theoretic Model for Stimulating High Performance of Regional Civil Servants in Russia

Abstract

The priority goal of the country’s top leadership is to ensure sustainable socio-economic development of all constituent entities of the Russian Federation and improve the quality of life of their population. In a challenging geopolitical situation, achieving this goal is difficult. Only under the condition of an effective system of public administration is it possible to solve the main socio-economic problems in the Russian regions. This requires linking the size of collective incentive payments to regional civil servants to the achieved level of socio-economic development of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The foregoing predetermined the relevance of the research topic. The purpose of the paper is to substantiate the bonus calculation mechanism for the executive branch employees of the Russian regions, depending on the assessment of their ability to work as part of a team to achieve results, i. e. to perform their duties to a high standard. This involves the use of modern methods of economic and mathematical modeling, designed in this case to ensure the objectivity of assessment of the collective and individual performance (efficiency) of regional civil servants. This is the main scientific novelty of the paper. The practical implementation of the mechanism of collective and individual incentives for regional civil servants will create the preconditions for increasing the wages of such employees in all regions of the Russian Federation. Thus, the coordinated actions of civil servants from different ministries and departments of the Russian subsidized regions in the future will help increase their financial security and transition to the group of donor regions, and ultimately will create the possibility of increasing budget expenditures on wages for the executive branch employees.

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