Street-Level Bias: Examining Factors Related to Street-Level Bureaucrats’ State or Citizen Favoritism

Abstract

Administration of street-level bureaucrats requires prior knowledge of what affects their use of discretion. However, there is a lack of understanding as to what influences their decision-making when choosing between claims made by the state or by its citizens. Without such knowledge, public administration at the street-level can sustain the perception that street-level bureaucrats have a state-preference bias, lowering citizens’ view of public service delivery by those perceived as the face of governance. This study focuses on decisions street-level bureaucrats make when resolving disputes between citizens and other state officials. Using real-world resolutions made over three decades by lower-court judges in Israeli civil tax disputes, the findings reveal a link between factors associated with street-level bureaucrats’ common characteristics and state favoritism in their resolutions. The findings also imply that policymakers who want to mitigate such outcomes can use citizen administrative participation-based influencers to promote street-level bureaucrats’ pro-citizen tendencies.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 12 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.