Religion, hypocrisy, and betting on secularity: reversing Smilansky's wager

Samuel Lebens · Daniel Statman

22 citations0/0 files storedReligious Studies

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Study and Philosophy of Religion Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Abstract Saul Smilansky presents us with a puzzle which, in combination with a small number of premises, is supposed to generate a reversal of Pascal's wager: the wagerer should bet on a secular lifestyle, and reject religion, as the surest way of pleasing God (if God exists). In this article, we argue that the puzzle, once unpacked, isn't particularly puzzling, that the premises aren't true, and that Smilansky's wager is open to both reductio and a reversal of its own.

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References

1990The case for motivated reasoning.2001If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?2004Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior 2010Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons 1997The Mythomanias: The Nature of Deception and Self-Deception 2012Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason 2017Hypocrisy and Moral Authority 2005Individual Differences in Motivated Social Cognition: The Case of Self-Serving Information Processing

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