Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

Thomas Brzustowski · Alkis Georgiadis-Harris · Balázs Szentes

24 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Auction Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42, D82, D86, L12)

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References

1972Durability and Monopoly 1982Durable-Goods Monopolists 1986Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture 1988The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts 1981Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing 1986An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence 1988Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics 1985Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information

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