Spillover Effects of Preventive Regulation and Corporate R&D Investment Catering: Evidence from China

Abstract

This paper explores the spillover effect of proactive preventive regulation represented by R&D expense inquiry letters (hereafter, RDILs) and its impact mechanism. Using deterrence theory and Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015–2020, we find that the industry receiving RDILs has a regulation effect on the R&D investment intensity catering motive of the non-receiving firms in the industry. That is, there is an industry spillover effect of RDILs regulation. The results of the regulatory mechanism analysis show that the industry spillover effect of RDILs regulation is more pronounced for non-receiving firms with more severe R&D manipulation intensity or weaker product market competitive positions. Further analysis shows that the inclusion of peer comparison questions in the RDILs increases the industry spillover effect of the inquiry letter regulation. We also find that the industry spillover effects of RDILs regulation result in higher future innovation quality for non-receiving firms. Overall, our study enriches our understanding of the effectiveness of inquiry letter regulation and provides some guidance for regulators’ regulatory practice.

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