Curtailing Bank Loan and Loan Insurance Under Risk Regulations in Supply Chain Finance

Wenli Wang · Gangshu George Cai

50 citations0/0 files storedManagement Science

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Supply Chain and Inventory Management Sustainable Supply Chain Management Working Capital and Financial Performance

Abstract

Because of many firms’ lack of collateral, banks have imposed loan limits as a form of risk-control regulations of bank financing. In response, loan insurance has emerged as a useful instrument to lift loan limits. To study the joint value of bank loans and loan insurance, this article investigates a supply chain composed of one supplier and one capital-constrained buyer who takes out a bank loan and potentially purchases loan insurance. The analysis reveals that both the supplier and the buyer can benefit from the bank financing with loan insurance in an insurance-cooperation region wherein the supplier is willing to reduce the wholesale price to entice the buyer to purchase insurance. Further still, in the insurance-cooperation region, worse contract terms of the bank loan benefit the supplier, whereas worse policy terms of loan insurance help the buyer. Such benefits can lead to a higher order quantity than the capital-abundant one and partially coordinate the entire supply chain. However, when production cost is low, the supplier and the buyer can encounter a Stackelberg prisoner’s dilemma, in which both firms no longer cooperate with each other, and both are worse off. Nevertheless, a government subsidy for the insurance premium can not only reduce the Stackelberg prisoner’s dilemma, but also improve the social welfare although it is not always optimal for the government to provide that subsidy. The main qualitative results are robust in a variety of extensions. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: The first author acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [Grant 72171162] and the Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China [Grant 20YJC630148], and the second author acknowledges support from the NSFC [Grant 72232001]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4827 .

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References

2003Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts 2000Value At Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk 2001Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts 2012Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts 1988Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger 2004Inventory Management with Asset-Based Financing 2012Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint 2008Financing newsvendor inventory

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