Does board structure matter firm’s value? The Jordanian evidence

Mohammed Т. Abusharbeh · Husni Samara · Noor Aldeen Kassem Al-Alawnh

19 citations0/0 files storedProblems and Perspectives in Management

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Corporate Finance and Governance Gender Diversity and Inequality Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

This study aims to examine the impact of board structure on firms’ value in Jordan. Panel regression estimates were used to analyze the data collected from forty-four non-financial firms that listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for the period 2010–2021. Random effects model was applied using a dependent variable (Tobin’s Q), four independent variables (board size, independent directors, female directors, and CEO duality), and four control variables (firm size, age, leverage, and liquidity). The result provides ample evidence that CEO duality exerts a direct positive effect on firm value in Jordan. However, none of the independent variables used has a significant impact on firm value, conflicting with agency and resources dependence theories. Firms value is significantly influenced only by two control variables, i.e., a positive impact of firm size and leverage at the 5% significance level. The results indicate the imperfection of corporate governance compliance by Jordanian listed firms in the area of ensuring maximum firm value. These results could be helpful to the policymakers in Jordanian listed firms to enhance their leadership qualities and satisfy CEO desires to avoid agency conflict.

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References

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