References

• 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring8,393 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1997Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector3,910 cited
• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 2013Intermediary Asset Pricing1,401 cited
• 2009Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity1,036 cited
• 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices925 cited
• 2008A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem719 cited
• 2010The Economics of Private Equity Funds671 cited
• 2006Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model639 cited
• 1995Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts537 cited
• 2011A Model of Capital and Crises499 cited
• 2017The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors407 cited
• 2014Capital allocation and delegation of decision-making authority within firms394 cited
• 2012Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity393 cited
• 2012Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK