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The Epistemic vs. the Practical
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The Epistemic vs. the Practical (2023)The Epistemic vs. the PracticalVarieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)Varieties of Moral Encroachme…There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame (2020)There is a distinctively epis…Doxastic Wronging (2018)Doxastic WrongingBelieving for Practical Reasons (2018)Believing for Practical Reaso…A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)A Combinatorial Argument agai…The Normativity of Rationality (2017)The Normativity of RationalityRationality Through Reasoning (2013)Rationality Through ReasoningValue and the right kind of reason (2010)Value and the right kind of r…Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame (2009)Moral dimensions: permissibil…Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)Epistemic Injustice: Power an…Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)Epistemic Partiality in Frien…A New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)A New Argument for Evidential…Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique (2003)Epistemic Rationality as Inst…The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and The Unity of Reason (1997)The Ring of Gyges: Overriding…Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions (1992)Contextualism and Knowledge A…Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives (1972)Morality as a System of Hypot…The Methods of Ethics (1962)Moral Luck (1981)The Moral Problem (1994)Deflationary Normative Pluralism (2007)REPLY TO COPP: NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND THE VARIETIES OF REALISM WORTH WORRYING ABOUT (2008)TOWARD A PLURALIST AND TELEOLOGICAL THEORY OF NORMATIVITY (2009)PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1941)The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories (1976)Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection (1991)DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE? (2011)The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty (2015)Reasons First (2021)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)The Aim Of Belief (2002)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (2020)The Epistemic and the Zetetic (2020)Moral Realism (1986)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)Doxastic Deliberation (2005)No Exception for Belief (2015)Fittingness First (2016)Opting for the Best (2019)Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure (2019)Inquiry and the epistemic (2021)Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing (2011)Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions (2012)Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression (2014)Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons (1999)Learning from Words (2008)The Nature and Value of Knowledge (2010)Natural Goodness (2001)The Myth of Morality (2001)The Emotional Construction of Morals (2009)Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition (2017)Ways to be Blameworthy (2019)The Morality of Defensive Force (2020)What is inference? (2012)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2007Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing3,800 cited
  • 2013Rationality Through Reasoning1,552 cited
  • 1972Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives1,132 cited
  • 1992Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions1,095 cited
  • 2017The Normativity of Rationality724 cited
  • 2003Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique608 cited
  • 2006Epistemic Partiality in Friendship458 cited
  • 2006A New Argument for Evidentialism446 cited
  • 2009Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame394 cited
  • 1997The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and The Unity of Reason201 cited
  • 2018Doxastic Wronging190 cited
  • 2010Value and the right kind of reason173 cited
  • 2018Believing for Practical Reasons168 cited
  • 2020Varieties of Moral Encroachment162 cited
  • 2018A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief150 cited
  • 2020There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame134 cited

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