Third-Party Brokers: How Administrative Burdens on Nonprofit Attorneys Worsen Immigrant Legal Inequality

Abstract

What happens when an administrative burden regime targets third-party brokers? This article describes the experiences of legal aid immigration attorneys during the Donald Trump administration, which made hundreds of changes to immigration law, policy, and processes. Through interviews with attorneys representing thirty-eight nonprofit legal services organizations, I document the learning, compliance, and psychological costs they incurred during this regime. The resulting consequences of these costs to attorneys’ caseload size and composition have implications for immigrants’ access to free legal services. I argue that targeting administrative burdens at third-party actors on whom people rely for access to government resources and recognition is an effective deterrent and a mechanism for exacerbating unequal outcomes. Future research should examine the impact of administrative burdens on a range of third-party actors who broker people’s access to government institutions and resources.

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