Optimal monetary policy in developing countries: The role of informality

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze optimal monetary policy in developing countries whose labor markets are characterized by the presence of a large informal sector. I develop a closed economy model with nominal price and wage rigidities, search and matching frictions, and a dual labor market: a formal one characterized by matching frictions and nominal wage rigidities, and an informal one where wages are fully flexible. Under this framework, a trade-off between price and wage inflation emerges. I find that informality increases the response of price and wage inflation to aggregate productivity shocks. As a result, the presence of an informal sector increases the inefficient fluctuations of labor market variables, such as unemployment, labor market tightness, and formal hiring rate. I find that optimal policy with informality features significant deviations from price stability in response to aggregate productivity shocks.

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