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Incentives or Disincentives?
16 references·0 citing·46 second hop
Incentives or Disincentives? (2023)Incentives or Disincentives?The University of Chicago Law Review (2017)The University of Chicago Law…Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2013)Understanding Regulation: The…The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law (2000)The Economic Theory of Public…Governing the commons — the evolution of institutions for collective action (1992)Governing the commons — the e…Bargaining in Legislatures (1989)Bargaining in LegislaturesRobustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence (1985)Robustness of the Multidimens…A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)A Theory of Competition Among…A Rational Theory of the Size of Government (1981)A Rational Theory of the Size…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheories of Economic Regulation (1974)Theories of Economic Regulati…Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Prices vs. QuantitiesProperty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral (1972)Property Rules, Liability Rul…The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)The Theory of Economic Regula…The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1969)The Logic of Collective Actio…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Crime and Punishment: An Econ…The Problem of Social Cost (1960)The Problem of Social CostEssays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Decentralized Procedures for Planning (1967)The Fundamental Approximation Theorem of Portfolio Analysis in terms of Means, Variances and Higher Moments (1970)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)The Use of Knowledge in Society (1996)The Environment and Directed Technical Change (2009)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)The Logic of Collective Action. (1966)Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1997)The quality of government (1999)The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century (2003)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Book Review: Organizational Behavior: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1966)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Economic Growth and Income Inequality (2019)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications (1995)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)The law of torts (2005)Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention (1962)A Theory of Oligopoly (1964)A Theory of the Allocation of Time (1965)Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Advertising as Information (1974)Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental taxonomy. (1993)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Book Reviews : The Theory of Political Coalitions. By WILLIAM S. RIKER. (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 300. $7.50.) (1963)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders (1998)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Party Policy in Modern Democracies (2006)The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason (1975)Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development (1996)Social Capital and the Environment (2001)Beyond Money (2004)The Digital Platform: A Research Agenda (2017)Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion (2019)The Regulation of Entry (2000)Politically Connected Firms (2006)
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References

  • 1960The Problem of Social Cost18,598 cited
  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach14,117 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1971The Theory of Economic Regulation8,269 cited
  • 1981A Rational Theory of the Size of Government5,485 cited
  • 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence4,118 cited
  • 1992Governing the commons — the evolution of institutions for collective action3,942 cited
  • 1974Prices vs. Quantities2,943 cited
  • 2017The University of Chicago Law Review2,058 cited
  • 1989Bargaining in Legislatures1,978 cited
  • 1972Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral1,928 cited
  • 2000The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law1,190 cited
  • 1974Theories of Economic Regulation1,184 cited
  • 1969The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups920 cited
  • 1985Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence827 cited
  • 2013Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice

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