The Epistemic Projection Approach to Values in Science

Abstract

Abstract I develop a novel account of how nonepistemic aims and values can appropriately influence scientific investigation. At its heart is a process of epistemic projection in which a nonepistemic aim or value is mapped to an epistemic research problem that aligns with that aim or value. Choices in research are then justified as a means of solving that research problem. This epistemic projection approach makes research responsive to nonepistemic aims and values yet remains consistent with the value-free ideal; it could be acceptable to parties on both sides of the values-in-science debate. It also promises to be useful in practice.

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