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Abstract The fight against corruption is presented as a leading principle in policy papers and at donor conferences discussing Ukraine's reconstruction. It therefore mirrors the usual narrative surrounding post‐war reconstruction and democracy promotion attempts. However, reconstruction aid has historically been used for illicit means by elites and ended up strengthening an uneven system rather than building a resilient and successful country, despite the window of opportunity for the latter. Rather than just proposing principles, this paper therefore poses the question of how actors involved in the reconstruction process can be bound to stick to their previously propagated and formally existing principles. The analysis combines academic and policy‐oriented studies and highlights the combined importance of the external and internal dimension for a successful outcome. It proposes a ‘double conditionality’ mechanism, where an independent, technocratic institution holds frozen, Russian assets and partially reimburses Western donors only after successful audits on the reconstruction aid are conducted. This conditionality puts domestic pressure on aid givers to follow through with the anti‐corruption conditions formulated beforehand and to call out any reform bluff on Kyiv's side. Paired with a credible EU accession perspective, this can bring about the much‐needed stimulus for a build back better scenario.
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