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When experimental psychologists make a claim (e.g., “Participants judged X as morally worse than Y”), how many participants are represented? Such claims are often based exclusively on group-level analyses; here, psychologists often fail to report or perhaps even investigate how many participants judged X as morally worse than Y. More troubling, group-level analyses do not necessarily generalize to the person level: “the group-to-person generalizability problem.” We first argue for the necessity of designing experiments that allow investigation of whether claims represent most participants. Second, we report findings that in a survey of researchers (and laypeople), most interpret claims based on group-level effects as being intended to represent most participants in a study. Most believe this ought to be the case if a claim is used to support a general, person-level psychological theory. Third, building on prior approaches, we document claims in the experimental-psychology literature, derived from sets of typical group-level analyses, that describe only a (sometimes tiny) minority of participants. Fourth, we reason through an example from our own research to illustrate this group-to-person generalizability problem. In addition, we demonstrate how claims from sets of simulated group-level effects can emerge without a single participant’s responses matching these patterns. Fifth, we conduct four experiments that rule out several methodology-based noise explanations of the problem. Finally, we propose a set of simple and flexible options to help researchers confront the group-to-person generalizability problem in their own work.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 48 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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