Recent Work on Gender Identity and Gender

Abstract

Our gender identity is our sense of ourselves as a woman, a man, as genderqueer or as another gender. Trans people have a gender identity that is different from the gender they were assigned at birth. Some recent work has discussed what it is to have a sense of ourselves as a particular gender, what it is to have a gender identity (Andler 2017, Bettcher 2009, 2017, Jenkins 2016, 2018, McKitrick 2015). But beyond the question of how we should understand gender identity is the question of how gender identities relate to genders. Our gender is the property we have of being a woman, being a man, being non-binary or being another gender. What is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender? According to many people’s conceptions and the standards operative in trans communities, our gender identity always determines our gender. Other people and communities have different views and standards: some hold that our gender is determined by the gender we are socially positioned or classed as, others hold that our gender is determined by whether we have particular biological features, such as the chromosomes we have. If our gender is determined by our gendered social position or whether we have certain biological features, then our gender identity will not determine our gender. There are several different ways of approaching the question what is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender? We can approach this question as a descriptive or hermeneutical question about our current concepts of gender identity and gender: what is the relationship between our concept of gender identity and our concept of gender? (Bettcher 2013, Diaz-Leon 2016, Laskowski 2020, McGrath 2021, Cosker-Rowland forthcoming, Saul 2012) Rather than focusing on descriptive questions about our gender concepts, many feminists, such as Sally Haslanger (2000) and Katharine Jenkins (2016), have proposed ameliorative accounts of the concepts of gender which we should accept; these are gender concepts which they argue that we can use to further the feminist purposes of fights against gender injustice and campaigns for trans rights. We might then ask the ameliorative question, what is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender according to the concepts of gender and gender identity that we should accept? However, some of the most interesting recent work on the relationship between gender identity and gender has focussed on the metaphysical issue of the relationship between being a member of a particular gender kind G (e.g. being a woman) and having gender identity G (e.g. having a female gender identity). As we’ll see, we can answer these different questions in different ways: for instance, we can hold that we should adopt concepts such that someone is a woman iff they have a female gender identity but hold that metaphysically someone is a woman iff they are treated as a woman by their society, that is, iff they are socially positioned as a woman. Four positions about the relationship between gender identity and gender that give answers to these ameliorative and metaphysical questions have emerged. This article will explain and evaluate these four positions. In order to understand these different views about the relationship between gender identity and gender it will help to have a little understanding of recent work on gender identity. The two most well-known and popular accounts of gender identity in the analytical philosophy literature are the self-identification account and the norm-relevancy account. On the self-identification account, to have a female gender identity is to self-identify as a woman. One way of explaining what it means to self-identify as a woman is to hold that such self-identification consists in a disposition to assert that one is a woman when asked what gender one is.1 On the norm-relevancy account, to have a female gender identity is to experience the norms associated with women in your social context (e.g. the norm, women should shave their legs) as relevant to you (Jenkins 2016, 2018). A first view of the relationship between gender and gender identity is what we can call gender identity first. According to a metaphysical version of gender identity first, what it is to be gender G (e.g. a woman) is to have a G gender identity (e.g. to have a female gender identity). Talia Bettcher (2009: 112), B.R. George and R.A. Briggs (m.s.: §1.3–4), Iskra Fileva (2020: esp. 193), and Susan Stryker (2006: 10) argue for gender identity first or views similar to it. And the view that our gender is always determined by our gender identity is, as Briggs and George discuss, part of the standard view in many trans communities and among activists for trans rights. One key virtue of gender identity first is that it ensures that gender is always consensual: on this view, we can be correctly gendered as gender G (e.g. as a woman) only if we identify as a G, and so we can be correctly gendered as a G only if we consent to be gendered as a G by others (George and Briggs m.s.: §1.3) (Figure 1).2 Gender identity first Elizabeth Barnes (2022: 2) argues that we should reject gender identity first as both a metaphysical and as an ameliorative view. She argues that (i) Some severely cognitively disabled people do not have gender identities, but (ii) These severely cognitively disabled people without gender identities have genders and should be categorized as having genders. And in this case, although having gender identity G is sufficient for being gender G, it is not necessary for being gender G nor necessary for being categorized as a G according to the concepts of gender that we should accept. So, we should reject gender identity first as both a metaphysical view and as an ameliorative view. Regarding (i), Barnes argues that gender identity requires awareness of various social norms and roles (and, moreover an awareness of them as gendered), the ability to articulate one’s own relationship to those norms and roles, and so on. But many cognitively disabled people have little or no access to language. Many tend not to understand social norms, much less to identify those norms as specifically gendered. (6) The norm-relevancy account of gender identity implies that this is true, since on this view having a gender identity involves taking certain gendered social norms to be relevant to you. And the self-identification account also seems to imply that having a gender identity involves having capacities that many severely cognitively disabled people do not have, since self-identification as a particular gender involves a to or be to that one is, or of as, a particular gender, and many severely cognitively disabled people do not have these Barnes has two for (ii) cognitively disabled people without gender identities have genders. Barnes argues that severely cognitively disabled people do not have gender identities have genders they (2022: instance, severely cognitively disabled women are to gendered and to a than severely cognitively disabled This as an for (ii) as a metaphysical the view that severely cognitively disabled people without gender identities have genders is the of what we in the Barnes argues that that some severely cognitively disabled people do not have genders they do not have gender identities or these severely cognitively disabled Gender identity first implies that people do not have genders their gender identity is that they have no gender. But Barnes argues that gender identity that severely cognitively disabled people without gender identities a gender is people have the to a gender identity but they of gender. Gender identity first implies that severely cognitively disabled people without gender identities to have genders they do not have the to a gender identity. So, it implies that they to have a gender in the way that and to have a gender by to have the capacities to have a gender than in the way that people do for people have these Barnes gender identity first others and severely cognitively disabled people from since have the to have a gender and having a gender of is a part of This seems as an that we adopt concepts of gender that imply that one is gender G iff one has gender identity G are and to such A account of the relationship between gender identity and gender is the this view gender identity and gender as On this no view, the that a woman has a sense of as a woman is what a of such as the way that is socially the way or biological features, a woman. accounts of gender imply the no view, (2000) account of gender. account proposed as an ameliorative account of the concepts of gender that we should adopt than as a metaphysical account of gender But in work Haslanger also account of gender as a metaphysical account of gender On account, to be a woman is to be one is or to have that are to be of a biological in on view, women are This view of what it is to be a woman implies that one’s being a woman is determined by one’s female gender identity. whether one has a sense of as a woman, is to assert that one is a woman or norms associated with women to be relevant to is necessary nor sufficient for one to be a our gender is not determined by our gender identity on account, one’s female gender identity can one to be a woman on account. instance, a trans female gender identity to which will have female which to being to a female biological in to be and so to be a woman on account. In this case, on account, female gender identity can to their a woman (Figure The no view Other accounts of gender imply the no view of the relationship between gender identity and gender. According to account of gender, to be a woman one has to have as a woman. But one can have a sense of as a woman without having as a woman and one can be as a woman without a sense of as a woman. So, having a female gender identity is necessary nor sufficient to be a woman on account it be that A will have a sense of as a woman if A as a or accounts of gender on which our genders are determined by our biological features, such as our also imply the no view, since to have a female gender identity is necessary nor sufficient for having The no view implies that many trans women are not instance, version of this view implies that trans women are not to have female by those in their are not so trans women are not as or not are not This is such trans women are not or to have that are to be of a biological in There are many such trans So, no views such as imply that many trans women are not women (Jenkins Some have that this is an for a metaphysical view about the relationship between gender identity and gender, trans women are women or this view trans women These are for ameliorative no that is, for views of how gender identity and gender are according to the concepts that we to accept. we should not adopt gender concepts that imply that we should not many trans women as women (Jenkins trans communities and communities gender on the of the gender identities people or which people are to have. with the no view is that it to imply that are no genders being or in these communities (Jenkins These do not that account of gender should be Elizabeth Barnes has that we can account of gender from the that it trans women by understanding it as an account of what our of gender. According to version of account, our of and our gender identities, are the of social of and people on the of version of account not imply that one is a woman iff one is one is or to have that are to be of one’s a biological in This is account is only an account of what to our of gender than an account of has what gender or of the gender concepts that we should accept. Barnes might a version of account from the that it trans But if this by account so that it the no view of the relationship between gender identities and version of account of gender is on the issue of the relationship between having gender identity G and being a member of gender So, of account of gender not the no view of the relationship between gender identity and gender. Gender identity first and no views such as are views of the relationship between gender identity and gender: they hold that the relationship between gender identity and gender not different A account of the relationship between gender identity and gender is the of According to this view, the that determine our gender, and so the relationship between gender identity and gender, is different from context to and have proposed of On their the gender that we have, or the gender that we are are determined by the way that we are treated in particular We are a member of gender G in virtue of our gender identity G in certain people are treated as genders on their gender But in we are a member of gender G in virtue of our gender identity in in which people are treated as a gender on than their gender identities such as or we are not of genders on our gender instance, trans woman is a woman in the context of the Trans is a but is not a women in the context of in as a woman and people as women on the chromosomes that they them to have is not a And is non-binary in the context of the one is a particular gender on one’s self-identification they are but is as in most and is treated as of their self-identification at work and in and so is not non-binary in most they are not on this view, is no such as being gender G that is, beyond whether one is a and the way one is treated or the standards that are operative in that So, it is not the that is non-binary or they are non-binary to one standard or context and not non-binary to can explain the way that some people are gendered from context to in explaining view, an of a is one of the at a nor a at the they to and one of the women and to help the women at their also to explain how people are gendered on the of their biological and gendered on their gender argues that a view is in explaining in many and trans people are or as they it by being and categorized as a member of a with which they do not such is to explaining the that trans people Jenkins (Figure However, are several with One is that it implies that gender in a when they that trans women are not women and trans are not trans women are not women according to the standards of many people and of many in many trans for instance, are not treated as and in many trans women are not women to the standard for is a woman, which is or So, for instance, when in the then that women have according to what in a only have and only have it is that only have trans have This and it implies that is in a sense in certain and we that it is Diaz-Leon and argue that we can this by although it is that trans are not to most we should and trans as We should trans as about how we should someone the gender that we should them as having are by and But although we should trans as they are not as a of social metaphysical So, we should as a metaphysical view about the relationship between gender identity and gender but not as an ameliorative view about the gender concepts we should accept; we can call this of views metaphysical that metaphysical to have to imply that many trans women are when they that they are women in many such as and are or gender argues that metaphysical not have this trans women are women to the gender operative in However, this will not always be a of that is a trans woman in in There are no communities or that But to be a woman, and that according to both of the accounts of gender identity that we discussed in has a female gender identity. We can that that is a woman is in the sense that it is to the gender operative in and But that we might is to the standards in some or And we might it that about their own gender is to the standards operative in some context that they not be This of is not what they and to it should be relevant in this trans people are to be from a or (Bettcher 2018, and If the only interesting way in which is about gender is that is that gender according to standards in the that is not then it that is about gender that not about these standards and that is in a sense This seems an if we that is a woman, that is, that is not There are two for seems to with how many of about our own and genders. instance, many trans that they should be as they are and not they are to the standards of communities and Gender that trans women are not that standards which with this view the and standards which with this view do seems to be in with the that many of our about gender are that is and that we it. In this case, it is for to with about whether only women have when that only women have we that means that only those as to the standards or to the standards operative and have And we with about since we that according to these standards trans are So, if is and we it is for to with be without our or it. In this case, we with But our only be we are about what of gender we gender are not or but in they And such a to of is a of a metaphysical for we should that do not imply that we are than that do imply this McGrath These with about the relationship between gender identity and gender are of that views in such as in According to their and their are always There is no such as an being only being or But a explaining and that the of the in the is and but they and they to be about which of their standards is and which standard the about which are and Cosker-Rowland If are no or of and then although and do they are such is in for them to So, seems to be to a kind of about we should and that they are about which of their standards is but is no such in have several of to this kind of or to to explain in these these be to the with about the relationship between gender identity and gender. McGrath esp. this and argues that these are not and that they similar to the by the proposed by in whether to these for or is that the that determine our gender from context to context and so whether our gender identity determines our gender from context to views such as gender identity first and the no view hold that one (e.g. gender identity or whether one is a determines our gender in But we not adopt such a we can adopt a view that that are relevant or our genders different (Figure A version of that has proposed is what we can call the two view. According to the two view, two and only two determine our gender in our gender identity and our gendered social position or Gender identity first and no view hold that one of these two determines our gender in the two view that both of these can a particular gender in of the relationship between gender identity and gender Katharine Jenkins an ameliorative version of the two view. She that we gender concepts according to which are two of woman. In one sense of woman, to be a woman is to have a female gender in another to be a woman is to be socially classed as a woman, which we can understand in of to be a woman in this sense is to be a Jenkins argues that if we gender concepts according to which are two of we do not trans since trans women are not socially classed as women do have female gender identities and so are women on this view. So, Jenkins argues that we should gender concepts such that A is a woman iff A is socially classed as a woman or has a female gender identity. She then argues although we should gender concepts on which are two of gender, we at use to to people with a female gender identity than those are classed as two view the with the ameliorative gender identity first and no not imply that severely cognitively disabled women are not women and it not imply that trans women are not if we adopt a concept of with two but use to to people with female gender identities, it seems that we adopt concepts according to which trans women are not socially classed as women are not women in an We to this with our ameliorative since trans women to be of as and many trans women to be of as in no way than being to as women than 2018). We might also t

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