Do updates matter? A comparison between rewards-based and donation-based crowdfunding platforms

Eliran Solodoha · Reut Blaywais

18 citations0/0 files storedJournal of General Management

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FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance Private Equity and Venture Capital Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing

Abstract

This study investigates whether updates are equally effective for ventures on rewards based crowdfunding and donation-based platforms. The results indicate that the relationship between the number of updates and the amount invested is insignificant on the latter platform. The study contributes to signaling theory by analyzing the efficacy of updates as a signal that increases the funds raised on various funding platforms. Entrepreneurs, supporters, and creators of crowdfunding platforms can benefit from the findings, which may improve the success of fundraising by tailoring signals in accordance with the type of crowdfunding platform.

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References

1980A Cognitive Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of Satisfaction Decisions 2013The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study 2015Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding 2014Internal Social Capital and the Attraction of Early Contributions in Crowdfunding 2015Equity Retention and Social Network Theory in Equity Crowdfunding 1978JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere.2013Crowdfunding 2009Performance persistence in entrepreneurship

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