Articlehybrid2023

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

Douglas G. Lee · Marco D’Alessandro · Pierpaolo Iodice · Cinzia Calluso · Aldo Rustichini C · Giovanni Pezzulo

16 citations0/0 files storedCognitive Psychology

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

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References

1992Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty 1993Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain environment.2010Visual fixations and the computation and comparison of value in simple choice 2012Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk 1993Context-Dependent Preferences 2001Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic connectionst model of decision making.2004Loss Aversion and Inhibition in Dynamical Models of Multialternative Choice.2014Dietary Self-Control Is Related to the Speed With Which Attributes of Healthfulness and Tastiness Are Processed

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