Fiscal State Aid Law and Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union

Abstract

Abstract The theme of this book is the relationship between harmful tax competition measures and prohibited fiscal State aid. It aims to present a targeted examination of the use of State aid rules against national tax measures, for example tax schemes and tax rulings, following the adoption of the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation in 1997. The fiscal State aid decisions and judgments covered include Commission decisions and ECJ judgments of the (early) 2000s, which are labelled the ‘first wave’, and recent Commission decisions and investigations into tax schemes and individual tax rulings, most notably the Apple, Fiat, Starbucks, and Amazon investigations, which are labelled the ‘second wave’. The characteristics and common threads of each wave are presented, similarities and differences between the two waves are dissected, and their nexus to the EU’s fight against harmful tax competition is explored. It is argued that an important factor connecting the two waves is the link they share to the fight against harmful tax competition. It is also maintained that the first wave cases that were linked to this fight have substantially influenced State aid doctrine, and have also had the effect of rendering State aid rules a more effective tool against harmful tax competition. This trend would have continued had the ECJ endorsed the Commission’s novel and creative approach in the second wave of fiscal State aid decisions. This approach is not legally sound, and was thus correctly rejected by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ in November 2022.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 12 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.