On wars, sanctions, and sovereign default

Javier Bianchi · César Sosa‐Padilla

49 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Monetary Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Global Financial Crisis and Policies Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Economic Sanctions and International Relations

Abstract

This paper explores the role of restrictions on the use of international reserves as economic sanctions.We develop a simple model of the strategic game between a sanctioning (creditor) country and a sanctioned (debtor) country.We show how the sanctioning country should impose restrictions optimally, internalizing the geopolitical benefits and the financial costs of a potential default from the sanctioned country.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 49 citations exist upstream.

References

1981Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 1988A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility 2007Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies 2005Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account 2018The External Wealth of Nations Revisited: International Financial Integration in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 2008Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies 2005Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates, and the Current Account 2018International Reserves and Rollover Risk

Cited by

2020Reserve Accumulation, Macroeconomic Stabilization, and Sovereign Risk

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.