Changing Gender Roles and Below-Replacement Fertility in Japan

Abstract

Abstract Like many industrialized countries, Japan has experienced two fertility transitions, the first an initial decline from historically high to replacement levels of childbearing, which occurred shortly after World War II, and the second a more recent decline from replacement to very low levels of fertility (total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.54 in 1990). In this chapter, we are concerned with explaining the second fertility transition. Why, despite the disturbing implications of very low fertility for Japan’s labour needs and problems of population ageing, are couples having so few babies in Japan? Recent demographic analysis has shown that, unlike fertility transitions in many countries in the West, Japan’s second fertility transition is almost entirely the product of nuptiality change and, in particular, of very low proportions of Japanese women marrying in their early to mid-twenties. An explanation of Japan’s second fertility transition must therefore focus on why so few women are marrying during their early adult years. One possibility is that changes in the structure of economic opportunities is leading young Japanese women to reject or postpone their assumption of traditional family roles. Another possibility, proposed by Richard Easterlin (1980), is that young men’s relative economic fortunes are declining, thereby leading them to postpone marriage. Yet another possibility is that the rise of so-called post-materialist values underlies low marriage rates, values that make marriage less attractive to both women and men. Our aim is to explore these explanations for recent declines in marriage to understand better what is driving Japan’s fertility to such low levels.

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