Practical Guilt

Patricia S. Greenspan

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Emotions and Moral Behavior Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Abstract Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a second-best substitute for action. Since, on the proposed account, emotions underpin the teachings of moral language, Greenspan shows how emotional capacities can affect the very content of morality by providing its motivational force.

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2002On “Positive” and “Negative” Emotions 2016Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism 2003III. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions 2021Tragedy and Postcolonial Literature 2013The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism 2001The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem 2019Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases 2019Agent‐Regret and Accidental Agency

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