Contrastive Knowledge

Jonathan Schaffer

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

Abstract Does G. E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore’s hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain-in-a-vat. Yes and no,says the con- trastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands.

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2006Anti-luck epistemology 2004From Contextualism to Contrastivism 2022Inquiring Minds Want to Improve 2012Knowledge entails dispositional belief 2012Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons 2008KNOWLEDGE IN THE IMAGE OF ASSERTION 2013Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions 2021Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry

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