Can Supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism?

Jaegwon Kim

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy and History of Science Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Abstract In ‘Thinking Causes’, Donald Davidson proposes to defend his doctrine of ‘anomalous monism’ (AM) against ‘misunderstandings and misrepresentations’ of his critics, myself included, who have called attention to its epiphenomenalist tendencies.1 Although part of what I am going to say will be in direct reply to Davidson’s specific points, I believe that several points of more general interest will emerge.

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2002Kim On Reduction 2003Language and Literature 2011Agency, Thought, and Language: Analytic Philosophy Goes to School 2011Narratives and Action Explanation 2002How Dispositions can be Causally Relevant 2009Replication without replicators

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