Reason and Responsibility

R. Jay Wallace

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics in Business and Education Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Abstract Can people ever be to blame for doing the rational thing? More broadly, what are the connections between the responsibility of moral agents and the rationality of the moral demands to which they are held accountable? As I see matters, these questions turn on the relations between two different practical points of view. Questions about the rationality of moral conduct are in the first instance deliberative questions, arising within the first-personal perspective of an agent trying to reach a decision about how to act. The task of practical deliberation, after all, is the task of determining what one has reason to do.

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2007Paradoxes of happiness 2015The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism 2021Acquaintance 2008Giving Dualism its Due 2007Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall 2004Religion, Rationality, and Experience: A Response to the New Rational Choice Theory of Religion 2014The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation 2019Russellian monism and mental causation

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