Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics

Abstract

Abstract Ethical intuitionism is historically important, widely referred to, and generally considered a major position in the foundations of ethics. But it is not widely discussed in depth. This is in part because, although it is held by some leading philosophers, its resources are often underestimated. It is certainly conceived divergently among ethical theorists, and those who find its central elements compelling may often think it easier and better simply to argue for their position under another name than to indicate what kind of intuitionism they hold and defend their position under that rubric. My aim here is to clarify intuitionism, to bring out some of its strengths and weaknesses, and to reassess the case for giving it a more significant place in contemporary ethical theory.

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