Affect, Value, and Objectivity

Abstract

Abstract In this essay I want to explore four propositions about the relation between values, affectivity, and objectivity, all of which can be found in Nietzsche’s thinking about the nature of value. At least two of them—(2) and (3)— are sometimes thought to be incompatible with each other. The propositions are: (1) Our fundamental mode of acquaintance with many values is through certain kinds of complex affective states, namely emotions. (2) Many values with which we are acquainted in this way are in a qualified sense objective— labelled here ‘phenomenally objective’. (3) Values are essentially dependent on emotions and other affective states, such as hedonic bodily sensations. A world without such states would also be a world without value.

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