On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action

Peter Railton

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract Perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising when a central notion of common sense proves elusive on reflection—that’s what makes the philosophical world go round. And some aspects of practical rationality seem obvious enough: rational agents form intentions, adjust means and ends, and so on. Yet even very elementary questions can excite not only controversy between conflicting, entrenched positions, but expert bafflement.

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2015Normative reasons as good bases 2009Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons 2016Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?2023Living Together 2023The Grounds of Political Legitimacy 2021Kant's Justification of Ethics 2015Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat 2011Why Be an Agent?

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