Introduction

Abstract

Abstract It is generally agreed that certain forms of intuitionism best reflect common-sense morality. One would have thought, therefore, that intuitionism has a certain default plausibility. But during the 1950s and 1960s intuitionism was rejected out of hand as an utterly untenable theory. How could a theory that aims to stick so closely to common sense come to be thought of as so implausible? Some criticized it on the ground that it succeeded in its aim of sticking closely to common sense too well, that it failed to tell us anything we do not already know, and is thus completely vacuous.2 Others criticized it for the opposite reason: they objected to it, not because it expresses a series of obvious truths, but because it makes metaphysical and epistemological claims that are excessively extravagant, and were thought to be patently false.

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