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Abstract IN his discussion of personal identity Hume draws a distinction to which his readers have not paid much attention. It is a distinction between ‘personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves’.1 I want in this paper, to examine this distinction and the use Hume makes of it. Although in doing so, I will be commenting some of the time on questions of Humean exegesis, my main concern is to try to throw some light on the role that the idea of oneself plays in our thinking about some of the areas of the emotional life that Hume considers. Let us first see why Hume introduces this distinction where he does. It appears in the Section ‘Of Personal Identity’ (Section VI of Part IV of Book I of the Treatise), and he says he must make it in order to answer a question about self-identity which he says, correctly, will carry his readers ‘pretty deep’. The question he wants to ask is this:
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